sentence of civilized man.,, 2 0
The Court recognized in Calder that entrusting State and Federal legislatures with such power was contrary to the core concept of free Republican government, in which men enter into society willingly in order to form a social compact. 21 As Justice Chase explained, "this fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free Republican governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit., 22 The framers of the Constitution infused a great deal of power into the federal legislature, but also left a great deal of power to the state legislatures to "enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; . . . declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all ... citizens in future cases; . . . [and] command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong.
2 3 However, the framers did not entrust the federal or the state legislatures with the power to "change innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private property." 2 4 Commentators have noted that the Ex Post Facto Clause in the Constitution serves three main functions. 25 First, it provides notice to the public "to assure that legislative acts give fair warning of their effect." 26 Second, it protects the right of citizens to reasonably rely on existing laws in choosing what actions to take, without fear that the laws will be changed capriciously or mali-20 I (" [T] he injustice and tyranny which characterizes ex post facto laws, consists altogether in their retrospective operation, which applies with equal force, although not exclusively, to bills of attainder.").
" See Calder, 3 U.S. at 388; Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and theJurisprudence of Punishmen 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261 REV. , 1275 REV. (1998 (noting that 'James Madison proclaimed that 'ex post facto laws ... are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation"). 22 Calder, 3 U.S. at 388. 23 Id.
24
' SeeAdler, supra note 17, at 1196-97; David S. Matteo, Welcome toAnytown, U.S.A.-Home of Beautiful Scenery (and a Convicted Sex Offender) : Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in E.B. v. Verniero, 43 VILL. L. REV. 581, 595 (1998) ; Logan, supra note 21, at 1276.
See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 Ct. , 1650 Ct. (2000 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Weaverv. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981) ); Adler, supra note 17, at 1196. (noting that it "ensures that citizens are given fair warning of what acts will be penalized and to what extent"); Matteo, supra note 25, at 595; Logan, supra note 21, at 1276 (noting that "ex post facto laws are especially unfair because they deprive citizens of notice of the wrongfulness of behavior, and thus result in unjust deprivations").
[Vol. 91 ciouslyY 7 Third, it preserves the principle of separation of powers by ensuring that "legislatures do not meddle with the judiciary's task of adjudicating guilt and innocence in individual cases."2 s The ban on ex post facto laws not only prevents the legislature from adjudicating guilt and innocence for an individual, but it also prevents the legislature from acting in an arbitrary or vindictive fashion while acting in ajudicial vein. applied the fourth Calder category, regarding a law that "alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender."" Consideration of these two early cases is crucial to understanding which procedural provisions the Court understood to be ex post facto in nature.
Calder v. Bull involved a resolution passed by the legislature of Connecticut that set aside a decree of the Court of Probate of Harford.m The decree in question disapproved and refused to record Normand Morrison's will.s As a result of this legislative resolution, Mr. Morrison's will was probated and recorded. 30 Calder and his wife, who would have inherited the estate if the will had not been probated, as the Court of Probate had originally ordered, were disinherited. 7 Caleb Bull, whose wife was named in Mr. Morrison's will, inherited the estate."' Calder and his wife claimed on appeal that the legislative resolution to set aside the decree of the probate court was an ex post facto law. 9 The Court held that the legislative decree was not an invalid ex post facto law. 0 Justice Chase reasoned that the Ex Post Facto Clause encompassed only penal statues, and that the "framers of the Constitution... understood and used the words in their known and appropriate signification, as referring to crimes, pains, and penalties, and no further.""' Because Calder's case involved a civil matter, the legislative resolution could not be ex post facto under the Constitution as a matter of definition.
Justice Chase further explored the Ex Post Facto Clause in reaching his holding, and explained there were four types of ex post facto laws:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. 43 In developing this definition, Justice Chase explained that he relied heavily on the works of William Blackstone and Rich-
See id.
17 See id at 387.
SId. 39 Id-
" See id. at 397 (noting that ex post facto laws are limited to penal statutes: "they extend to penal statutes and no further; they are restricted in legal estimation to the creation, and, perhaps, enhancement of crimes, pains and penalties"). " Id. See Adler, supra note 17, at 1193 (explaining that the Ex Post Facto Clause has been interpreted to prohibit only legislative acts that operate to the detriment of a criminal defendant).
42 3 U.S. at 397 (noting that "ex post facto laws must be limited in the manner already expressed [to criminal statues]; they must be taken in their technical, which is also their common and general, acceptation, and are not to be understood in their literal sense").
4-Id. at 390.
ard Wooddeson, as well as the definitions given in the constitutions of Maryland, North Carolina, and Massachusetts.4 As an example of the fourth category of ex post facto laws, Justice Chase cited briefly to the case of Sir John Fenwick in 1 6 9 6 .4 The details of this case are important because the Carmelt Court relied significantly on them in determining that laws that altered the sufficiency of evidence needed to obtain a criminal conviction were ex post facto."
In SirJohn Fenwick's case, an act of Parliament proclaimed that two witnesses were necessary to convict a person of high treason 4 John Fenwick, a Jacobite, plotted with two coconspirators to restore James II to the throne after his overthrow by King William EEI in the Revolution of 1688." The number of conspirators expanded over the course of a few months, and the throne began arresting the conspirators one by one after three of them disclosed the restoration plot to the King.
4 9 The conspirators were systematically arrested, tried, convicted of treason and put to death. 50 When Fenwick was eventually arrested, there were only two witnesses among the group of conspirators who could prove Fenwick's guilt, George Porter and Cardell Goodman. 51 Fenwick's wife was successful in bribing Goodman to leave the country, and under the act of Parliament, Porter's testimony alone would not be sufficient to obtain a conviction. 2 The House of Commons reacted to Goodman's absence by passing a bill of attainder against Fenwick, nullifying the tvo-" See id. at 391. It is important to note that none of the Constitutions cited byjustice Chase included a provision for the fourth category of Calder. The Massachusetts constitution provided that ex post facto laws were "laws made to punish actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws; the Maryland Constitution provided that ex post facto laws were "retrospective laws punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal"; and the North Carolina Constitution provided the exact same definition as the Maryland Constitution. Id. at 391-92.
See id. at 389 n.A.
" See infra, Section IVA, at 37 (discussing the majority's analogy betwveen the facts of Carmell's case and the facts of Fenwick's case).
" See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 , 1629 (2000 . shall not pass any ex post facto law; or, in other words, they shall not inflict a punishment for any act, which was innocent at the time it was committed; nor increase the degree of punishment previously denounced for any specific offence." In adopting the language of the state constitutions, neither Justice Iredell nor Justice Paterson made any mention of laws altering the sufficiency of the evidence needed to obtain a criminal conviction when formulating a definition of ex post facto laws. 9 The Court did not consider the fourth Calder category again until sixty-eight years later, in Cummings v. Missouri. In Cummings, the Court applied the fourth Calder category to invalidate a "test oath" imposed by the Missouri state constitution. 6 ' In the wake of the Civil War, Missouri's legislature implemented the oath, designed to ensure loyalty to the Union. 62 The affiant of the oath was required to deny "that he ha [d] 6 See id. at 395-400. 57 See id.; Carme, 120 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (highlighting the fact that "Justices Paterson and Iredell in their own seriatim opinions gave no hint that they considered rules of evidence to fall within the scope of the Clause").
"3 U.S. at 396 ("[Wjhen after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed, the Legislator, then, for the first time, declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon a person who has committed it.").
'9 See Carme/!, 120 S. Ct. at 1651 (GinsburgJ., dissenting). 71 U.S. 277, 316 (1866) . [Vol. 91 thereof,'" or "that he ha [d] ever, 'by act or word,' manifested his adherence to the cause of the enemies of the United States, foreign or domestic.. .."6 The Missouri constitution provided that any person who was unable to take the oath was declared incapable of holding certain offices in the state, including "'any office of honor, trust, or profit."6 These offices included the posts of "councilman, director, or trustee, or other manager of any corporation, public or private, . . . professor or teacher in any educational institution, or in any common or other school."6 Additionally, the constitution provided that anyone who did not take the oath could not practice law, or practice as a "bishop, priest, deacon, minister, elder, or other clergyman, of any religious persuasion, sect, or denomination."' Cummings, a Roman Catholic Priest, was convicted of teaching and preaching without first having taken the oath.0 Cummings challenged the oath on the grounds that it was an invalid ex post facto lawr s The Court held that the test oath violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.6 Justice Field, writing for the Court, adopted the Calder four-category formulation and reasoned that the test oath fell under the fourth category, the prohibition on laws that change the "rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required."" Justice Field reasoned that the clauses in the test oath "subvert the presumptions of innocence, and alter the rules of evidence, which heretofore, under the universally recognized principles of the common law, have been supposed to be fundamental and unchangeable." 7 Justice Field explained that the test oath merely assumed that parties were guilty, without affording them the presumption of innocence that is embedded in our legal system.7 In promulgating such a test oath, Justice Field argued, "Id. 64 id. "Id. at In Kring, the Court invalidated a Missouri law of criminal procedure as an invalid ex post facto law under the fourth category of Calder. 7 8 Kring was charged with first-degree murder, but, after negotiations with the prosecutor, ultimately pled guilty to second-degree murder.9 When he was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, Kring appealed the conviction, claiming that the prosecutor promised only a ten-year sentence.0 The Supreme Court remanded his case for further proceedings, and Kring was then tried and convicted for first-degree murder and sentenced to death. 8 ' nocence can be shown only in one way-by an inquisition, in the form of an expurgatory oath, into the consciences of the parties"). [Vol. 91 The law in Missouri at the time that Kring committed the offense provided that a criminal defendant could not be tried for first-degree murder after an accepted plea of guilty for second-degree murder was entered.2 In 1875, after Kring committed the offense, that law was abrogated, and criminal defendants who pled guilty to second-degree murder could be tried for first-degree murder."' The U.S. Supreme Court held that the application of the new law to Kring was a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause." This holding adopted the fourth category of Calder, and gave it a very liberal reading, noting that "any law passed after the commission of an offense which,. . .in relation to that offense, or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage, is an ex post facto law. " s7 In his second trial, Hopt was again convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The prosecution at this second trial offered the testimony of a man who was serving a sentence for murder at the time that he testified.8 m As of the date that Hopt committed the offense, Utah law provided that convicted felons were incompetent to testify in criminal trials. 9 " After the date of the homicide, but before the date of Hopt's first trial, the law was amended to allow felons to testify." Hopt challenged his conviction on the "2See id. at 224.
See id. at 223 (noting that the "law wvas abrogated, and for this reason the defendant could be tried for murder in the first degree, notwithstanding his comiction and sentence for murder in the second degree"). Statutes which simply enlarge the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases are not ex post facto in their application to prosecutions for crimes committed prior to their passage; for they do not attach criminality to any act previously done, and which was innocent when done, nor aggravate any crime theretofore committed, nor provide a greater punishment therefore than was prescribed at the time of its commission, nor do they alter the degree, or lessen the amount or measure, of the proof which was made necessary to conviction when the crime was committed.
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Justice Harlan further explained that laws of witness competency did not fall under the fourth category of Calder because they did not change "the quantity or degree of proof necessary to establish . . .guilt," and because they did not change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.
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In Thompson v. Missouri, the Court again altered the test for determining whether a law fell under the fourth Calder category, holding that a procedural law was ex post facto if it affected a "substantial right" of the criminal defendant. 9 Y In Thompson, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of a priest with strychnine poison. 9 8 Thompson's trial centered on a prescription for strychnine that the prosecution offered as evidence against Thompson.9 The trial court admitted letters written in Thompson's hand, allowing the jury to compare the letters to the strychnine prescription. ' At the time that Thompson committed the offense, such letters were inadmissi- ble as a matter of law.' In 1895, the general assembly of Missouri passed a law providing that "comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved... to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness.., of the writing in dispute.' ' 02 Thompson challenged the application of this new law to his case, arguing that the letters should not have been admitted ' The Court held that the application of the new Missouri law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.' The Court analyzed Kring and Hopt, and adopted the language that procedural laws were ex post facto where they "alter the situation of a party to his disadvantage." 0 5 The Court added, however, that the alteration must affect a "substantial right" of the criminal defendant.' 6 The Court concluded that "mere modes of procedure," were not ex post facto. Finally, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, explained that the law in this case was not ex post facto because it did not "disturb the fundamental rule that the state, as a condition of its right to take the life of an accused, must overcome the presumption of his innocence, and establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' ' 3 Justice Harlan explained that the ultimate question of whether Thompson had written the prescription was left for the jury to decide, and that the jury's decision was governed by the same duty before and after the passage of the law.°9 '0 See id at 384 (noting that the law in Kringwas invalidated because the right to protection against a first-degree murder conviction was a "substantial one").
" 7 Id at 386. Justice Harlan noted:
[I]t is well settled that the accused is not entitled of right to be tried in the exact mode, m all respects, that may be prescribed for the trial of criminal cases at the Lime of the commission of the offense charged against him ... so fbr as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party has no more right in a criminal than in a civil action to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. In Beazell, the Court upheld a statute of criminal procedure dealing with defendants who were jointly indicted, tried, and convicted."' The defendants in Beazell were jointly indicted for embezzlement." 5 At the time the defendants committed the offense, Ohio law provided that "when two or more persons are jointly indicted for a felony, on application to the court for that purpose, each shall be tried separately."" 6 After the commission of the defendants' offense, but before their trials, the law was changed to provide, "when two or more persons are jointly indicted for a felony, except a capital offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court for good cause shown... order that one or more of said defendants shall be tried separately.""1 7 Beazell was jointly tried with his co-defendant, and convicted."" He challenged application of the new law to his case on the basis that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause." 9 statute. The statue did nothing more than remove an obstacle arising out of a rule of evidence....").
", 269 U.S. 167 (1925).
.. , 497 U.S. 37 (1990 It is settled, by decisions of this court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex 121 post facto.
In setting out this definition, Justice Stone omitted the fourth category of Calder2 2 However, the Court did reason that the Ohio statute was not ex post facto, in part because "the quantum and kind of proof required to establish guilt, and all questions which may be considered by the court and jury in determining guilt or innocence, remain the same."' * Justice Stone acknowledged that previous judicial decisions have held that alterations of the rules of evidence or procedure could be ex post facto, and cited Calder, Cummings, and Kring.
4
But Justice Stone explained that these kinds of procedural changes were not to be considered ex post facto unless they deprived the accused of a defense. If they operated "only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage," they were not ex post facto125 Finally, Justice Stone explained that there was no formula for determining what alterations of procedure were "of sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition."
1 26 It could be argued thatJustice Stone collapsed the fourcategory Calder definition into three with this reasoning, includ- ' 24 Id (explaining that "[e] xpressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constimtional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure").
.id at 170-71. 26 Id. at 171.
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ing changes in the rules of evidence in the definition only if they deprived the accused of a defense. 27 In Collins, the Court adopted the Beazell definition of ex post facto laws, and upheld a Texas statute that allowed reformation of improper verdicts. 2 8 Defendant Carroll Youngblood was charged and convicted of aggravated sexual assault, and was sentenced by a jury to life imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.2' The imposition of a fine was not authorized by statute, and, under the controlling case law, 30 the judgment and sentence were void, and Youngblood was entitled to a new trial.1 3 ' While
Youngblood was in the process of petitioning for habeas corpus relief, the legislature passed a law allowing appellate courts to 132 reform improper verdicts. Relying on this law, the trial court reformed Youngblood's verdict by ordering deletion of the fine.
3 3 Under the old version of the law, Youngblood would have received a new trial after the improper verdict was rendered."" Under the new law, the trial court was able to delete the fine, thereby reforming the verdict without need for a new trial. 35 7 Id at 52 (noting that application of the law to "respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause"). It is interesting to note that Justice Stevens, author of the Carmell majority opinion, concurred in the judgment in Collins. See id. at 52 (StevensJ, concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens agreed with the conclusion in Collins, but reasoned that the conclusion was "entirely consistent with out precedents." Id. at 52-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see infra note 143 (discussing the Court's decision in Collins to overrule Kring and Thompson). Justice Stevens reasoned that under the framework of Kring and Thompson, as interpreted by Beazell, the question of whether a procedural statute has a sufficiently drastic impact on a defendant to be characterized as "substantial" is "a matter of degree." See Collins writing for the Court, cited the four Calder categories, and noted that the principles of the definition, and the meaning of the Clause itself, was best summarized by BeazelL [A] ny statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to the law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto. 'S Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Beazell formulation omitted the fourth category of Calder and explained that the Beazell formulation was faithful to "our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause." s9 Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the early state constitutions mirrored the formulation of ex post facto laws set forth in Beazell. " The Beazell formulation, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, comported with Blackstone's definition of ex post facto laws as well.' 4 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist ultimately applied the elements of the Beazell formulation, one by one, to Youngblood's case, and determined that the application of the new Texas statute did not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause. In addition to adopting and applying the Beazell formulation for determining whether a law is ex post facto, the Collins Court v.Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 57 (1990) (StevensJ., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens proposed a "threshold test," under which the Court would nullify a procedural statute if it affected "the modes of procedure by which a valid conviction or sentence may be imposed." Id. at 58 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment); see also infra Section IVA, at 38 (Justice Stevens' discussion of procedural laws that disproportionately aid the prosecution in obtaining a conviction 141 Id. at 44 (Blackstone explained that ex post facto laws were passed "when after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it").
" See id. at 52 ("The Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed. Its application to respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of Art. I, § 10").
overruled two earlier cases, Kring and Thompson.1 3 In overruling these cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that Kring and Thompson's discussion of "substantial protections," and "substantial personal rights," had "imported confusion into the interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.'
4'
The Court reasoned that testing a statute to determine if it was "merely procedural" or if it implicated a "substantial right" was not consistent with the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause at the time that the Constitution was drafted.
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1996, defendant Scott Leslie Carmell was charged in a 15-count indictment by a Texas grand jury for various sexual offenses committed against his stepdaughter. " ' Carmell was charged with eight counts of indecency with a child, two counts of aggravated sexual assault, and five counts of sexual assault against his daughter; he was convicted on all fifteen counts in the 367th District Court in Texas. 4 7 Carmell committed the offenses against his daughter over a prolonged period of more than four years, from February 1991 to March 1995. " " Carmell's daughter was twelve years old when Carmell began victimizing her, and sixteen when the conduct ceased. " 9 The assaults ended in 1995, when Carmell's daughter told her mother what had happened.' The Court sentenced Carmell to life imprisonment for each of the two aggravated sexual assault offenses and imposed concurrent twenty-year sentences for each of the remaining thirteen counts in the indictment. '-' Carmell was ,,3 I. at 50, 51 (overruling Kring, overruling Thompson). It is interesting to note thatJustice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion in Carmell, did not agree that Kring and Thompson should be overruled. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra note 137. Instead, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's conclusion was "entirely consistent with our precedents." Collins, 497 U.S. at 52-53.
... Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990) . "' See id at 47 ("Neither of these decisions, in our view, is consistent with the understanding of the term 'ex post facto law' at the time the Constitution was adopted").
16 See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 , 1624 (2000 . A conviction under Chapter 21, Section 22.011, or Section 22.021, Penal Code, is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged offense within six months after the date on which the offense alleged to have occurred. The requirement that the victim inform another person of an alleged offense does not apply if the victim was younger than 14 years of age at the time of the alleged offense.'1 Under the Texas statute, a sexual offender could not be convicted on the basis of a victim's testimony alone, unless one of two exceptions applied." The first exception created an "outcry" provision; a victim's uncorroborated testimony was sufficient to support a conviction if the victim told anyone, other than the defendant, about the offense within six months after the date on which the offense was committed.'5 The second exception created a "child victim" provision, which applied based on the victim's age; a victim's uncorroborated testimony was sufficient to support a conviction if the victim was under fourteen years old on the date of the offense.'G Carmell committed eleven offenses against his daughter during the time that these provisions were in effect. 57 Six of the offenses were committed when Carmell's daughter was under fourteen, and they were not contested. 1 m On September 1, 1993, the Texas statute was amended. The amendment extended the child victim exception to victims under eighteen years of age. 9 Carmell was convicted in 1996 under the provisions of the amended statute.)O Of the fifteen counts for which Carmell was charged, he committed four of them while the older version of the statute was in place and while his daughter was fourteen to fifteen years of age. 6 ' Thus, if the older version of the statute were applied to these offenses, Carmell's conviction could not stand; his daughter did not satisfy the outcry provision and was not young enough to qualify under the child victim provision of the statute.
Five of the remaining offenses for which Carmell was charged occurred after the amendment of the statute and were therefore not contested. 63 The two counts of aggravated sexual assault, for which life imprisonment sentences were imposed, were not at issue. ' The defendant appealed four of his convictions for offenses committed betweenJune 1992 andJuly 1993, during which time his daughter was fourteen and fifteen years old and before the Texas law was amended.'6 On appeal, Carmell argued that the older version of the Texas statute should have applied to those offenses committed prior to the 1993 amendment. ' Carmell further asserted that the four convictions he was appealing could not have stood under the older version of the statute because the victim's testimony was uncorroborated, the victim was over fourteen years of age, and the victim had not made an outcry to satisfy the outcry provision. 67 Carmell argued that applying the new law to offenses committed before the statute was amended violated the Constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws.r"
The The Court first analyzed the components of the Texas statute, and determined that "Texas courts treat Article 38.07 as a sufficiency bf the evidence rule, rather than as a rule concerning the competency or admissibility of evidence."'" Justice Stev- See supra note 137, at 143 (discussingJusice Stevens' reasoning that the question of whether procedural statutes violate the Ex Post Facto Clause is a matter of degree); see also infra Section IVA, at 38-40 (discussion of procedural rules altering the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to obtain a conviction).
176 See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1624. '7 See id. at 1625 n.2 (explaining that the Texas statute included three components: an "outcry" provision, a "child victim" provision, and "a sufficiency of the cvi-ens based this determination on the differences between the consequences of the rules of evidence admissibility, and the consequences of Texas Article 38.07.78 He noted that "when evidence that should have been excluded is erroneously admitted against a defendant" under the ordinary rules of evidence, an appellate court will reverse a conviction and remand for a new trial, whereas a "failure to comply with Article 38.07, by contrast, results not in remand for a new trial, but in the reversal of conviction and remand for entry of an order or acquittal." 1 The Court then analyzed the history and purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution and adopted the definition of ex post facto laws set out in the early case of Calder v. Bull. 180 Justice Stevens explained thatJustice Chase derived the four-category definition of ex post facto laws outlined in Calder largely from the treatise of Richard Wooddeson, "one of the great scholars of the common law."' 8 Justice Stevens noted that the same formulation had been approved by such great academics as Joseph Story and James Kent. 82 In support of the formulaion, the majority cited a host of Supreme Court cases that had adopted the four-category formulation 183 and argued that these dence rule respecting the minimum quantum of the evidence necessary to sustain a conviction").
'78 Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 , 1625 , n.2 (2000 .
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Id.
" In order to fully understand the implications of the fourth category of Calder, the Court turned to the English case of Sir John Fenwick' 8 6 The same case is cited in Calder under the fourth category for the proposition that statutes altering the sufficiency of the evidence needed to convict a criminal defendant are invalid, ex post facto laws.'n The majority analogized Fenwick's case to Carmell's, arguing that the laws in each case "alter[ed] the legal rules of evidence," receiving less testimony than the law required at the time the offenses were committed."s Justice Stevens argued that the circumstances in Fenwick's case paralleled the circumstances in Carmell Just as the relevant law in Fenvick's case required more than one witness' testimony to support a conviction .... Texas' old version of Artide 38.07 required more than the victim's testimony alone to sustain a conviction.... And just like Fenwick's bill of attainder, which permitted the House of Commons to convict him with less evidence than was othenvise required, Texas' retrospective application of the amendment to Article 38.07 permitted petitioner to be convicted with less than the previously required quantum of evidence.'
The Court then argued that the fourth category of Calder functions as a safeguard against the subversion of "fundamental justice.19O As Justice Stevens explained, the interests of fundamental justice were at the heart of the passage of the Ex Post Facto Clause.' 9 ' The framers desired to protect against laws that '" Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) ("4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender"). 'Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 , 1628 -29 (2000 . I&For a discussion of the facts of SirJohn Fenwick's case, see supra Section I1B. "8 See Carmell 120 S. Ct. at 1629-31; see also Calder 3 U.S. at 389 (citing "the case of SirJohn Fenwick, in 1696" as an example of laws that "violated the rules of evidence. .. by admitting one witness, when the existing law required two; by receiving evidence without oath; or the oath of the wife against the husband; or other testimony, which the courts ofjustice would not admit.. ' Carmd4 120 S. Ct. at 1631. "' Id. at 1631-32. ," Id. at 1632 (noting that "the fourth category, so understood, resonates harmoniously with one of the principal interests that the Ex Post Facto Clause ias designed to serve, fundamental justice").
were "manifestly unjust and oppressive.' 92 The majority insisted that the fourth category addressed these concerns directly and that "a law reducing the quantum of evidence required to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as retrospectively eliminating an element of the offense, increasing the punishment for an existing offense, or lowering the burden of proof."
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The Court distinguished an ordinary amendment to the rules of evidence from an alteration in the rules of evidence favoring the prosecution.'4 Justice Stevens pointed out that most amendments to the rules of evidence apply in an evenhanded fashion, adversely affecting or benefiting both sides equally.' 95 In contrast, the Court argued that the amendment to Texas Article 38.07 could only benefit the prosecution.' 6 Justice Stevens argued that retroactively applying any statute such as this one, "making it easier to meet the threshold for overcoming the presumption" of innocence, is fundamentally unfair. 197 He argued that in so doing, the government "refuses, after the fact, to play by its own rules, altering them in a way that is advantageous only to the State, to facilitate an easier conviction."' Thus, the Court concluded that laws of this nature allow the government to "subvert the presumption of innocence by reducing the number of elements it must prove to overcome that presumption; by threatening such severe punishment so as to induce a plea to a lesser offense or a lower sentence; or by making it easier to meet the threshold for overcoming the presumption."'"
The majority concluded that the four category definition of ex post facto laws outlined in Calder, including the fourth category involving laws that alter the rules of evidence, continue to " Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 , 1632 (2000 (adding that the Ex Post Facto Clause was drafted "as an additional bulwark in favour of the personal security of the subject, to protect against the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny").
... Id. at 1632-33. '4See id. at 1633. See id. (reasoning that rules of evidence "are ordinarily evenhanded, in the sense that they may benefit either the State or the defendant in any given case," and arguing that regular rules regarding admissibility "do not at all subvert the presumption of innocence, because they do not concern whether the admissible evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption"). without using the fourth category of Calder, Justice Stevens argued that instead, Collins did not abandon the fourth category and was "rather cryptic."2 The Carmell Court noted that Collins referred to Calder's four categories as the "exclusive definition" of ex post facto laws but also called Beazell's definition a "faithful" rendition of the original understanding of the clause, even though it omitted category four.2 A footnote in Collins explains, as the majority pointed out, that "the Beazell definition omits the reference by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull to alterations in the legal rules of evidence. As cases subsequent to Calder make clear, this language was not intended to prohibit the application of new evidentiary rules in trials for crimes committed before the changes."m Justice Stevens acknowledged that Collins went on to assert that the Beazell formulation was true to the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause.2 But Justice Stevens explained: "if Collins had intended to resurrect a long forgotten original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause, shom of the fourth category, we think it strange that it would have done so in a footnote." 8 The majority concluded that Collins merely "eliminated a doctrinal hitch" that had developed in the case law, defining the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause along the lines of distinguishing between substantial protections and procedural provisions.-Thus, the Court summarized, "Collins held that it was a mistake to stray beyond Calder's ' See id at 1643.
"' See id

nSee id
See infra Section IVB.
2 Carml4 120 S. Ct. at 1635. Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 , 1635 -36 (2000 [Vol. 91 was committed."m Article 38.07, the majority argued, is the latter -a sufficiency of the evidence rule.j t The Court distinguished between laws of witness competency and sufficiency of the evidence laws by explaining that witness competency laws apply in an evenhanded fashion, whereas the sufficiency of the evidence laws work in perpetual favor of the prosecution. m In this case, Justice Stevens argued, Article 38.07 functioned as a sufficiency of the evidence rule, working only in favor of the prosecution in every case.M
B. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT
In a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg attacked the majority opinion on three general grounds. First, Justice Ginsburg questioned the majority's conclusion that Texas Article 38.07 is a "sufficiency of the evidence rule" and argued that the statute is functionally equivalent to witness competency and credibility rules, held to be non-violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause under Hopt v. Utah. 224 Next, Justice Ginsburg argued that the fourth category of Calder applied only to those laws that lowered the prosecution's burden of persuasion.m Justice Ginsburg noted that Texas Article 38.07 in no way affected "the burden of persuasion that the prosecution must satisfy to support a conviction."2 Finally, Justice Ginsburg argued that the fourth category of Calder is no longer valid law.
22 7 She argued that Collins v. Youngblood m "pared the num-
MI&
See id
See id. at 1639-40 (noting that such rules will always run in the prosecution's favor, because "they always make it easier to convict the accused.... Witness competency rules, to the contrary, do not necessarily run in the State's favor. A felon witness competency rule, for example, might help a defendant if a felon is able to relate credible exculpatory evidence").
' See id; See supra Section IVA, discussion of the majority's reliance on Fenwick's case for the proposition that Texas Article 38.07 fell under the fourth Calder category of ex post facto laws.
.. See Carmell v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620 , 1646 (2000 . (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (noting that "the history of Article 38.07 bears out the view that its focus has always been on the competency and credibility of the victim as a witness"); See Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1884).
' Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
2Id.
ber of Calder categories down to three, eliminating altogether the fourth category on which the Court... so heavily relies." ' 2 ' The dissent first attacked the majority by pointing out that Texas Article 38.07 is not a "sufficiency of the evidence rule" as the majority had claimed, but is rather a rule "functionally identical to a conditional rule of witness competency. 2 3 0 According to Justice Ginsburg, Texas Article 38.07 is an evidentiary provision under which the jury may credit victim testimony. 23 Thus, if a victim falls under one of the exceptions in the statute (either by virtue of age alone, or by making an "outcry" within the specified time period), the statute simply gives the victim full testimonial stature, and an undiminished competency to testify. 2 3 2 The premise for this statute, the dissent argued, is the legislative judgment that accusations made by sexual assault victims above a certain age were not independently trustworthy. 3 Justice Ginsburg likened the corroboration requirement in the statute to corroboration requirements in similar evidentiary provisions, particularly those regarding accomplices. 2 The dissent argued that accomplice corroboration requirement statutes, like Texas Article 38.07, were "designed to ensure the credibility of the relevant witness," not to affect the sufficiency
of the evidence required to obtain a conviction.
Justice Ginsburg further indicated that the legislative history of Texas Article 38.07 bears out the interpretation of 38.07 as a witness competency and credibility provision.
23 6 As Justice Gins-110 S.Ct. 2715 (1990) . " Carmell 120 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). 2 Id-at 1649 (GinsburgJ., dissenting). 2" See id. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "the version of Article 38.07 applied at Carmell's trial was thus, in both effect and purpose, an evidentiary rule governing the weight that may be given to the testimony of sexual assault victims who had attained the age of 14").
232 Id. at 1645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "If the victim is of a certain age, the jury, in assessing whether the prosecution has met its burden of demonstrating guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, must give no weight to her testimony unless that testimony is corroborated, either by other evidence going directly to guilt or by 'outcry"').
23 See id. (GinsburgJ., dissenting). See id. at 1645-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that "it suffices to note that Article 38.07's corroboration requirement rests on the same rationale that underpins accomplice corroboration requirements: the notion that a particular witness, because of his or her role in the events at issue, might not give trustworthy testimony").
"'I& at 1645 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). See i&. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
burg explained, "the historical development of Article 38.07 reveals a progressive alleviation of restrictions on the competency of victim testimony, not a legislative emphasis on the quantum of evidence needed to convict.
" 2 7
The dissent explained that Article 38.07 was functionally equivalent to a witness credibility statute: "If the former version of Article 38.07 had provided that 'the testimony of the victim shall be inadmissible to prove the defendant's guilt unless corroborated,' it would produce the same results as the actual statute in every case."2 s Under Hopt,2 9 Justice Ginsburg argued, rules of evidence affecting witness competency do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 4 Next, Justice Ginsburg argued that Article 38.07 did not alter the prosecution's burden of persuasion and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as interpreted through the fourth category of Calder. 24 ' The dissent pointed out that the prosecution's burden of persuasion remains the same whether or not Article 38.07 applies; regardless of its application, the prosecution must prove all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
24 2 As Justice Ginsburg noted, if the prosecution seeks to obtain conviction on the basis of a victim's uncorroborated testimony, and the witness satisfies one of the exceptions under Article 38.07, the conviction can only be obtained if the prosecution proves all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the application of 38.07.243 Thus, satisfaction of 38.07 can be necessary to obtain a conviction where the prosecution seeks to obtain the conviction on the victim's uncorroborated testimony alone, but it is not sufficient unless the prosecution meets its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 24 Further, Justice Ginsburg argued, the victim's testimony is not even necessary in many cases: "To convict a defendant of sexual assault in Texas today as before 27 Id. (GinsburgJ., dissenting). 1993, the prosecution need not introduce the victim's testimony at all, much less any corroboration of that testimony." 45 The dissent ultimately concluded that Article 38.07 merely functioned to restrict the State's method of proving its case, "without affecting in any way the burden of persuasion that the prosecution must satisfy to support a conviction." 46 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg argued that the amendment to Article 38.07 did not "reduce the quantum of evidence necessary" to convict, for the "simple reason that Texas has never required the prosecution to introduce any particular number of witnesses or items of proof to support a sexual assault conviction" in the first place.24 Further, the dissent noted that Article 38.07 did not "subvert the presumptions of innocence," using the language of the majority, because "the burden of persuasion remained at all times with the State. 248 In sum, Justice Ginsburg depicted the "sufficiency of the evidence" needed to convict as an evidentiary hurdle; the 1993 repeal of the corroboration requirement for victims between the ages of fourteen and eighteen did not lower that hurdle, according to Justice Ginsburg, but "simply expanded the range of methods the State could use to surmount" that hurdle. 9 Finally, the dissent argued that the fourth category of Calder has been effectively nullified by subsequent Supreme Court cases.25 Justice Ginsburg highlighted the fact that the fourcategory definition of ex post facto laws in Calder was dictum, as Calder involved a civil statute, not a criminal one."' Further, the dissent indicated that Justices Iredell and Paterson, in their own concurring opinions, "gave no hint" that they considered the 211 Id (GinsburgJ., dissenting). 246 Id (GinsburgJ., dissenting) . 217 Id (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). 248 Id. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's reliance on Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867), from which the phrase "subvert the presumptions of innocence" originated, was misplaced, because Cummings dealt with a post-Civil War amendment that assumed parties were guilty of treason unless they swore an oath to establish their innocence. The dissent noted that "nothing of the kind" is involved in the Carmellcase).
21 Carmelg 120 S. Ct. 1648 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
'See id. at 1651 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
2" See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that 'Justice Chase's formulation was dictum, of course, because Calder involved a civil statute and the court held that the statute was not ex post facto for that reason alone").
[Vol. 9 1 rules of evidence to fall within the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 2 Justice Ginsburg pointed to the ex post facto formuladon in Beazell and Collins and noted that they omitted the fourth category of Calder completely,1
In Beazell, Justice Ginsburg noted, the Court catalogued ex post facto laws without even mentioning Calder's fourth category,2 and Collins approved of this formulation, concluding that "the Beazell formulation is faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. " 2s
The dissent attacked the majority's assertion that the Court has repeatedly endorsed Justice Chase's formulation.2
Although the majority cited what Justice Ginsburg called "an impressive-looking" array of cases in support of this assertion, she pointed out that all of the cases cited "simply quoted or paraphrased Chase's enumeration, a mechanical task that naturally entailed a recitation of the fourth category. " 2 7 Further, the dissent noted that not one of these cases depended on the fourth category for the judgment the Court reached. m Justice Ginsburg explained that the only two cases to strike down retroactive application of rules as ex 9ost facto under the fourth category of Calder, Kring v. Missouri" and Thompson v. Utah, " 2" See Beaze!4 46 S. Ct. at 68 (defining ex post facto laws as "any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed").
Carmell v, Texas, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1651 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990) Third, even if the majority were correct in its assertion that Texas Article 38.07 qualifies as an ex post facto law under the fourth Calder category, the majority ignored subsequent case law that effectively nullified that category. 2 " The majority's reasoning further confuses the precedent to be applied in determining whether procedural laws violate the Ex Post Facto Clause by ignoring the formulation set forth in Beazell and adopted in Collins, a formulation that had made important strides toward eradicating such confusion. 6 7
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OR WITNESS COMPETENCY PROVISION?
First, the majority's decision was incorrect because Justice Stevens incorrectly asserted that Texas Article 38.07 is a rule altering the sufficiency of the evidence needed to obtain conviction. Instead, Texas Article 38.07 functions as a law of witness competency and credibility.2 8 The majority's reasoning focused facto the retroactive application of rules governing the functioning of the criminal trial process-but both decisions have since been overruled").
"2 See id. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's "sufficiency of the evidence label... will not stick").
2 See id. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "the corroboration requirement of Article 38.07 is functionally identical to a conditional rule of witness competency").
26 See id at 1629 (turning to a lengthy discussion of Fenwick's case for "guidance"). See id at 1654 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the facts of the petitioner's case do not parallel the facts of Fenwick's case "300 years earlier").
' See id at 1651 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting) (reasoning that "a strong case can be made that Collins pared the number of Calder categories down to three, eliminating altogether the fourth category on which the Court today so heavily relies").
267 See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990) (noting that prior precedent had "imported confusion into the interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause").
' See supra note 9.
on the notion that "requiring only the victim's testimony to convict, rather than the victim's testimony plus other corroborating evidence is surely 'less testimony required to convict. ' " 2 9 As such, the majority argued that Texas Article 38.07 is a sufficiency of the evidence rule that "governs the sufficiency of [the] facts for meeting the burden of proof. " 270 The majority's reasoning neglects one fundamental fact about Article 38.07: it does not alter the reasonable doubt burden that the prosecution must carry in order to obtain a conviction.
27 ' As the dissent pointed out, " [u] nder both the old and the new versions of the statute, the applicable standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. " , 7 2 The majority insists that requiring only the victim's testimony, rather than the victim's testimony plus corroborating evidence, lowers the bar on what the prosecution has to overcome to meet this burden, but this reasoning is flawed. 27 The prosecution is not required to produce the victim's testimony in order to obtain a conviction; the prosecution may put any evidence it chooses before the jury, and as long as the prosecution meets its burden of proof, the conviction will stand. 274 Texas Article 38.07 does not alter that fundamental burden of proof. 275 Moreover, even if the prosecution were to produce only the testimony of a victim who did meet the requirements under Article 38.07, that testimony would not be sufficient unless the C Garmell v. Texas, 120 S. CL 1620 , 1631 (2000 .
Id. at 1639.
2' See id. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 27 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) . 2 See Adler, supra note 17, at 1204-06 (explaining that accomplice corroboration statutes, which are equivalent to Texas Article 38.07 in that they require corroborating evidence to "sustain a conviction," do not alter the ultimate burden of proof for the trier of fact. Rather, they set out a threshold determination for the judge of whether the testimony can be put before the trier of fact).
2' See Adler, supra note 17, at 1204-05. The author explains that accomplice corroboration laws require ajudge to make a preliminary determination of whether the evidence may be put before the trier of fact. If the judge determines that there is sufficient corroborating evidence, the testimony may be put before the trier of fact. If there is not sufficient corroborating evidence, the witness may not testify. Texas Article 38.07 functions as an accomplice corroboration law does: so long as the judge determines that there is corroborating evidence, the testimony is put before the trier of fact, but the ultimate issue of whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof remains a question for the trier of fact.
27 See Carmel, 120 S. Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting In fact, Article 38.07 functions exactly as a law of witness competency does, making Carmell's case analogous to Hopt. 2 18 As the dissent correctly explained, the policies behind 38.07 and laws of witness competency are the same: in the passage of each of these types of laws, the legislature expresses concern about the credibility of a certain class of witnesses based on the special circumstances involved in their case.' 79 The laws function in the same manner as the dissent argues, because "if the victim is of a certain age, the jury, in assessing whether the prosecution has met its burden of demonstrating guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, must give no weight to her testimony unless that testimony is corroborated." 8 Likewise, a law of witness competency provides that the testimony of a certain class of witnesses is to be given no weight by the jury. Because 38.07 operates as a rule of witness competency, the dissent argued, it is analogous to Hopt, and is not ex post facto because it "simply enlarge [s] the class of persons who may be competent to testify in criminal cases." 8 '
The dissent's analysis of 38.07 as a law of witness competency is preferable to the majority's analysis of it as a sufficiency of the evidence rule, because the dissent's view comports best with the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Law Clause. 2 The ex post facto ban assures citizens fair warning and reasonable reliance and prohibits the legislature from improperly interfering in the judicial process.
Article 38.07, like an accomplice corroboration statute, is consistent with these goals and purposes. The majority explained that an analysis of Fenwick's case would be helpful because it is cited in Calder as an example of the fourth category of ex post facto laws.2" The majority devoted a substantial portion of the opinion to discussing the facts of Fenwick's case and to analogizing those facts to Carmell's situation.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that Texas Article
See id (noting that a defendant is "on constructive notice of the criminal nature of her action and the degree to which society would seek to punish it").
28 See id
Id see also supra Section VA (discussion of the egregious nature of laws that single out individuals).
2" See supra, Section IVA, at 38-39 (discussion of the majority's analysis of Fenwick's case).
2" See Carme/ 120 S. Ct. at 1629 ("Justice Chase and Wooddeson both cited several examples of ex post facto laws, and, in particular, cited the case of SirJohn Fenvick as an example of the fourth category. To better understand the type of law that falls within that category, then, we turn to Fenwick's case for preliminary guidance").
' See supra Section IVA (discussion of majority's analogy between Fenwuch and Carmelt; see also supra Section lIB (discussion of the facts of Fenwick's case).
38.07 fell under the fourth Calder category of ex post facto laws because the facts in Carmell paralleled those in Fenwick's case. 29 Although Justice Chase did cite to Fenwick's case as an example of the fourth category, Fenwick's case was never discussed again by the Supreme Court, not even in those cases that involved a procedural rule that would come under the fourth category of Calder. 2 If Fenwick's case were considered an important guiding principle in a determination of ex post facto laws under the fourth Calder category, the Court would have used it as such in the precedent cases addressing procedural statutes. 295 Additionally, Fenwick's case is mentioned only briefly in Calder? 96 and is cited as an example of more than one category of ex post facto laws. 29 7 As the dissent noted, the four-category formulation in Calder is itself only dictum. 298 The majority made no attempt to explain why Fenwick's case should be resurrected as a '"uide" for determining if procedural laws were ex post facto.
In short, the majority diverged from the reasoning of well-establish precedent in using Fenwick's case, a case mentioned only briefly in Calder and never again, as a major deter- .' See id. at 1631-32 (the majority noted that "Indeed, the circumstances of petitioner's case parallel those of Fenwick's case 300 years earlier").
' Id. at 1630; See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323 (noting that bills of attainder "are generally directed against individuals by name," and that " [b] ills of this sort... have been most usually passed in England in times of rebellion, or gross subservency to the crown, or of violent political excitements; periods, in which all nations are most liable (as well the free as the enslaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights and liberties of others").
•3 SeeTax. CODE CRB1. P. ANN. art. 38.07 (West 2000) ; se also Crmel4 120 S. Ct. at 1624.
" See Calder, 3 U.S at 390. Ifiustice Chase cited Fenwick's case because of the particularly egregious act of Parliament in altering the rules of evidence to target one edzvidual, than the Carmell Court's analogy fails. Texas Article 38.07, unlike the law in Fenwick's case, was not amended in order to target an individual.
?'-' See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323 (explaining the special nature of Bills of Attainder:. "In these cases the legislative body, in addition to its legitimate functions, exercises the powers and office ofjudge; it assumes, in the language of the text-books, judicial magistracy, it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguards of trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether conformable to the rules of evidence or otherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with its own notions of the enormity of the offense"); see also Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills of Attainder, and the Definition of Punishment: on Doma, the Hawaii Amendment, and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48 SRACUSE L RE%. 227, 238-39 (1998) .
-See id. "7 See Carme/! 120 S. Ct. at 1650-51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Texas Article 38.07 does not implicate either of two important purposes for which the Fx passed with Scott Leslie Carmell in mind but as a general measure, affecting all citizens. As the dissent argued, "the amendment of Texas 38.07 simply brought the rules governing certain victim testimony in sexual offense prosecutions into conformity8 with Texas law governing witness testimony generally." 8 Moreover, Texas Article 38.07 removed none of the protections of a criminal trial; Carmell received a full trial, with benefit of counsel, before a jury, and he was presumed innocent until the prosecution could prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had committed the offenses for which he was charged. Because Fenwick's case involved a Bill of Attainder, it is inherently different from Carmell's case; whereas Fenwick was the target of "vindictive" legislation, aimed specifically at him, Carmell was simply subjected to a general procedural rule applied to all criminal defendants in sex offense cases.
C. THE MAJORITYS TREATMENT OF BEAZELL AND COLLINS
Third, the majority's decision was incorrect because even if Justice Stevens was correct in his assertion that Article 38.07 meets the definition set forth in the fourth Calder category, the majority ignored precedent that effectively nullified that category. 3 0 The majority argued that Collins was at best "cryptic" on the issue of whether the fourth Calder category was still good law. 31 Further, the majority argued that if Collins intended to nullify the fourth category of Calder, "we think it strange that it would have done so in a footnote." 31 ' These arguments avoid the ultimate conclusion reached by Collins.3 2 First, Collins paid deference to the four categories of Calder, but only as a general principle, and the Court further explained that the Beazell definition was the one best suited to the original understanding of the Post Facto clause was promulgated: "to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed," and to " [restrict] governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation").
Id. at 1651 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). See Collins, 497 U.S. at 37. 0 See Carmell, 120 S. Ct. at 1635 (noting that "it seems most accurate to say that Collins is rather cryptic").
... Id. at 1636. 1 It is interesting to note that Collins was authored by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, who dissented in Carmell. Wouldn't ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the author of Collins, be in the best position to determine if the Court meant to nullify the fourth principle of Calder? Of course.
[Vol. 91 framers. 13 The majority is correct that the Collins Court mentioned Beazell's omission of the fourth Calder category in a footnote, but the fact that the Court did so does not necessarily mean that it was any less serious about adopting the Beazell definition. It is important to note that directly after the Collins Court explained the omission, it adopted the Beazell definition as "faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause." 1 4
Most importantly, in analyzing the facts involved in Collins, the Court did not apply the four categories of Calder;, the Court ultimately applied the Beazell formulation in determining that the Texas statute did not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though the statute was a rule of procedure. 3 5 The majority in Carmell ignored the fact that the Collins Court ultimately applied the Beazell formulation, and ignored the fact that the Collins Court did so with a rule of procedure, one which typically should have been subjected to analysis under the fourth category of Calder. 1 d The Collins Court's ultimate application of the Beazell formulation as a pragmatic matter, along with its ringing endorsement of the Beazell formulation in direct comparison with the four Calder categories (and the explicit recognition that Beazell omitted the fourth category) lead to one inescapable conclusion: the Collins court effectively nullified the fourth category of Calder, and replaced the four-category Calder formulation with the more general formulation provided in Beazell. 
I
31' See id. at 51. The Court applied the Beazell test in reaching its holding: "The Texas statute allowing reformation of improper verdicts does not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed. Its application to respondent therefore is not prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause. (1998) (acknowledging that the Collins Court adopted the Beazell formulation for the definition of ex post facto laws, and acknowledging that the Braze! formulation omitted the fourth category of Calder); Matteo, supra, note 25, at 595.
